Validity of Unusual Conditions in Wills by Schramm, Bonita E.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 3 
January 1924 
Validity of Unusual Conditions in Wills 
Bonita E. Schramm 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bonita E. Schramm, Validity of Unusual Conditions in Wills, 9 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 220 (1924). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss3/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
VALIDITY OF UNUSUAL CONDITIONS IN WILLS.*
The right of a testator to dispose of his property by a
will is not an inherent right or one of citizenship, nor is it
even a right granted by the constitution. It rests wholly on
legislative force and is derived entirely from statutes.1 The
use or beneficiary interest in land as recognized by the Court
of Chancery was disposable by will until the Statute of
Uses2 in 1535 declared to the contrary. The real statute
creating wills was passed in 1541 and is known as the
Statute of Wills.' It empowered a testator to give all his
lands "at his own free will and pleasure." There were
several restrictions but they do not concern us in this
discussion.
Every nation that is concerned with Anglo-American
law has adopted the Statute of Wills and they recognize the
right of a testator to dispose of his property as he sees fit
provided he does not violate the law. Usually the testator
is quite particulal as to whom he gives his property and if
he has any peculiar hobbies concerning that person they
frequently creep into the will. These hobbies usually take
the form of conditions.
As a way of summing up these conditions, the following
statement of the rule is made in Cyc: 4 "A devise or bequest
may be conditioned on the beneficiary pursuing particular
lines of study or possessing a certain education; or his pur-
suing a certain trade or occupation; or his membership in a
particular religious body, adherence to certain religious
*Is a condition in a Will that the continuance of the devisee's estate shall
depend upon his adherence to unusual conditions, valid?
1. Costigan's Cases on Wills, p. 174.
2. 29 Henry VIII.
3. 32 Henry VIII.
4. 40 Cyc. 1708.
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beliefs or attendance at a particular church; or his education
or the educatioia of his children in a particular religious
faith or Order. The Courts have frequently sustained condi-
tions precedent or subsequent that a devisee or legatee
should return to or reside in a particular place or occupy
the premises devised, etc., but such a condition as applied
to a married woman may be illegal and void as tending to
cause separation from her husband." It has long been
settled that a condition tending to restrain marriage is void.
Often the will requires a person to entirely change his
habits of life. This might be said to be unfair. A dead
person should not be allowed to use his will as a skeleton
hand to guide the devisee according to the testator's ideas
and wishes. But, hasn't the devisee the right to ignore the
devise, if he thinks more of his present habits than he
thinks of the devise? The reason most of these suits get
into court is because the devisee wants to "eat his cake and
have it, too." He must take his choice. The courts vary
in their decisions as to the fairness of these conditions, but
the great majority hold that the testator's right to dispose
of his property is paramount to the devisee's right to the
property with or without the condition. The only ground for
a contrary opinion is the condition that is void as against
public policy. Restraint of marriage is a condition of that
class.
For the purpose of this discussion we have chosen to
take six main conditions. First, the condition that the
devisee be of a certain religion or belong to a certain reli-
gious Order; second, that the devisee become temperate in
his habits and abstain from liquor; third, that the devisee
follow a certain occupation or trade; fourth, a restriction as
to place of residence; filth, a condition as to the education
of the devisee or his children; sixth, a condition that is in
restraint of marriage.
The decisions as to the validity or invalidity of a
condition prescribing a certain religion are mooted, that is,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss3/5
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there are cases decided both ways. The first Amendment to
the Constitution provides that: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." This clause has caused a great
deal of argument and is always mentioned in connection with
decisions on the question, but this clause was not intended
to deprive a testator of the right to dispose of his property
according to the dictates of his own conscience. It was to
prohibit Congress from establishing a State religion. It
icannot be said that the condition deprives the devisee of
religious freedom because he is not bound to comply with it
and receive the property. He can keep his former religion
and forfeit his rights to the property.
There is really only one American case holding that the
condition is void. That is the case of Drace v. Klinedurst,
and was decided June 24th, 1922. The Court held that a
condition in a will that the continuance of the estate shall
depend upon the devisee's adherence to the doctrines of a
particular religion is void. It wyas said to be against public
policy and to hamper religious freedom. How can it be
against public policy? In what way does it affect the public?
It is a question te be decided by the devisee himself. If he
thinks too much of his present religion, he must forfeit the
property. This case is the only American case that leaves
the beaten path and holds opposite to the trend of Authority.
Another case, Maddox v. Maddox,' might be considered
in the above class. But this case, although of the religious
type, was decided on the ground of restraint of marriage.
The testator left his daughter a legacy, on condition that
she continued to be a member of the Society of Friends.
There were only five or six unmarried men of the Society in
the neighborhood. She married a man not of the Society
and then ceased to be a member of it. It was held that
5. 275 Pa. 266.
6. 11 Gratt. (Va.) 804.
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there was an unreasonable restraint of marriage and it was
therefore void.
The majority of courts of Anglo-American jurisprudence
have taken a broader outlook on the subject. They realize
that the decision of changing a religion is up to the devisee
and should he choose his former habits then the property
must be forfeited. Several cases show the attitude taken by
the court with regard to priests.
In Barnum v. Baltimore,' a much cited case, at the time
of the testator's death, the son, Frank Barnum, was not a
priest but later he joined the priesthood. He was entitled
to receive the income of the estate until he joined the Order.
In Spencer v. See,8 the testator made a gift to Seymour
Spencer upon express condition that he renounce the Cath-
olic priesthood, and that he marry. Held, that Seymour had
all his life to perform the requirement and the estate could
go to the other representatives until his death, he not having
performed the requirements. These cases do not treat the
conditions as void as against public policy. The young
priests thought more of their Order than of the property;
but as the testators did not want them to have both, they
forfeited the estate by holding on to their religion.
The same principle holds true as to nuns. In two cases
a Nova Scotia case, Re Trust Funds,9 and a Maryland case,
Mitchell v. Mitchell, ° that point was decided in favor of the
validity of the condition.
In Magee v. O'Neill" it was held that a condition that a
man's daughter should be sent to a Catholic school and be
reared a Catholic in order to receive money was not void as
against public policy. I should think an exception to the
7. 62 Md. 275.
8. 5 Redf. (N. Y.) 442.
9. 1 Sim. N. S. 37; 61 Eng. Reprint 14.
10. 18 Md. 405.
11. 19 S. C. 170.
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above statement is where the testator tries to separate
mother and child by declaring the child shall be a member
of a different religion than the mother in order to receive
a legacy. This would most certainly be against public
policy and therefore void.
The condition that a boy should attend the regular
meetings of a certain named church is certainly not a viola-
tion of religious freedom. 12 It is also held that requiring
membership in a certain church is not in opposition to
religious freedom.
The case of Hodgson v. Halford'3 is an unusual one.
The mother in her will divided her property among her
children on condition that they should not marry anyone
who was not born a Jew or who was not of the Jewvish
religion or that they (the children) should not become
Christians. The son married a Christian during his mother's
life but without her consent. The daughter became a
Christian after her mother's death. It was held that the
conditions were not void as against public policy and they
were effectual to forfeit the rights of both son and daughter.
A condition providing that the devisee must be of tem-
perate habits in order to receive the estate is on a different
basis. It cannot be said to be a violation of the Constitution.
There is a moral issue involved and the courts have always
been known to uphold moral questions. It is for the better-
ment of himself, both socially and financially, for the devisee
to abstain from liquor and it is for the benefit of the com-
munity as well. Of cofirse, if he considers the condition too
burdensome he can forfeit his rights to the estate.
The case of Hauke v. Emyart14 illustrates the upholding
of a condition to abstain from liquor. A devise was made in
favor of a son who drank liquor and who married a woman
12. Iii Re Paulson's Will, 127 Wis. 612.
13. 11 Ch. Div. 959; 27 Wkdy. Rep. 545.
14. 30 Neb. 149.
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not of the testator's choice and against his will. He was
to get the property provided he changed his habits and
became temperate, and provided also, that he did not live
with his wife within ten years after the testator's death.
It was held that the condition for temperate habits was valid
but the other condition was a restraint of marriage and
therefore void. The case of Onderdonk v. Onderdonk1 5
supports this decision and we have been able to find no
contrary case.
The condition as to occupation offers interesting spec-
ulation. Suppose the testator should go so far as to state
a certain occupation that must be followed. Then the
devisee meets with certain obstacles which he cannot over-
come. What is he to do? The case of Seeley v. Hincks'6
involves this question. The testator, Barnum, the showman,
desired to make his nephew take up the show business.
Barnum's partner refused to let the nephew in the business
so Barnum put a condition in his will that the nephew must
follow the show business in order to receive the legacy.
After the testator's death, the plaintiff (the nephew) offered
his services to the defendant (Barnum's partner), who re-
fused them because he resented the fact that Barnum put
such a condition in his will. The Court held that the plain-
tiff's desire to comply with the condition in that he offered
his services to the defendant, who refused them, amounted
to performance and that the condition had been complied
with.
The testator might be a man of set notions and one who
has a particular liking for a certain kind of trade. The de-
visee might be wholly incapable of following this trade. For
instance, a lame man might be required to do something
that necessitates a great deal of walking or a person with
one arm might be required to do a task that requires two
15. 52 Hun. (N. Y.) 614.
16. 65 Conn. 1.
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arms. When the prescribed work is too difficult for the
devisee to physically perform then the condition, in my
judgment, should be void. The devisee ought not be made to
forfeit his right to the property because he is mentally in-
capable that is, insane. The courts would not allow him in
any business when he is insane, therefore, he should have the
property even if the condition cannot be fulfilled.
In Webster v. Morris,17 the Court says that a bequest
with a condition that a party shall learn some useful trade,
business or profession is valid and is not indefinite or un-
certain or against public policy. But, if only the word trade
is mentioned in the will, can a business or profession be in-
cluded under this heading?
The case of Colby v. Dean,18 answers this question. The
will provided that the children should have the property if
they followed some useful trade. The plaintiff was a school
teacher. It was held that the word trade meant an occupa-
tion and that school teaching filled the condition.
The condition for education is for the betterment of the
devisee more than any other one that we are considering in
this discussion. And yet, why is it that a great many leg-
atees want the money without fulfilling the requirements?
The courts ought to be extremely strict in upholding this
sort of a condition.
In the case of Redmond v. Burroughs,' the testator put
$2,000 in trust for the education of his son. He, the testator,
survived the making of the will twelve years. When he died
his son was a married man twenty-four years old. He bad
refused to go to school during his childhood and declined to
go to school after his father's death. The Court held that he
could receive the legacy even though he refused to go to
school. The courts probably would not hold this way today.
17. 66 Wis. 366.
18. 70 N. H. 591.
19. 63 N. C. 242.
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There is no reason why a married man twenty-four years old
could not go to school, especially if he wanted the legacy.
He seems to be a lazy boy who had a dislike for school all
his life. If he opposed his personal improvement and educa-
tion why should he be paid $2,000 for his ignorant indif-
ference?
A case tending to show the other extreme is Shepard v.
Shepard.20 Here it was held that where the money was left
for a theological education, this money could not be used to
defray the expenses of a scientific education. That decision
holds to the word of the will in their strictest sense. The
courts seem to wander on decisions pertaining to education
and they are not as particular as they might be in enforcing
this condition.
A case illustrating this point is Coppedge v. Weaver.21
The devisee's mother said that the son should not marry
until lie received an education, although she made no finan-
cial provision for the same. It was held that the son did not
forfeit his right to the property when he did not get any
further education after his mother's death because he
already had a limited education. If she had thought his
education sufficient she probably would not have put a pro-
vision for further education in her will. The case of Baker
v. Red 22 upholds the educational condition of a will.
A testator has a right to require a certain place or resi-
dence for the devisee. In Jenkins v. HorVitz23 the Court
held a condition that the devisee should not leave the prop-
erty before the time of expiration mentioned in the will,
valid. In Marston v. Marston24 it was held that where it is
provided in the will that if the devisee's mother ceases to
be a widow he can have the property, he loses his rights if
20. 57 Conn. 24.
21. 90 Ark. 444.
22. 34 Ky. 158.
23. 92 Md. 34.
24. 47 Me. 495.
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he leaves the place. In Lowe v. Cloud25 the Court held a
condition that a party must come to live on the land in order
to receive it, valid. This rule, however, like all others, has
certain exceptions.
Separation of a family or separation of a mother and her
small children would excuse a non-compliance with the con-
dition. In the same manner the separation of a husband
and wife is void.20  The States as a whole agree to the gen-
eral doctrine of residence.27
"The general rule regarding a condition in restraint of
marriage is that general restraint of marriage as in the case
of a legacy or devise to a person on condition that he shall
or shall not marry or a gift of an estate on his marriage is
void as being against public policy and therefore illegal.
The courts have long been champions of the sacred institu-
tion of marriage but like their decisions regarding other
conditions, their views on this subject are not to declare all
conditions pertaining to marriage void." ' 28
In the case of Greene v. Kirkwood20 the courts have sus-
tained a condition against a devisee marrying a man below
her "in social position." Conditions have been held valid
prohibiting marriage under a certain age or marrying with-
out the consent of those interested in the devisee's welfare.
If the courts held void a condition that the legatee should
not marry a certain person it would defeat the efforts of a
testator or his executors to control his untrustworthy chil-
dren after his death.
25. 45 Ga. 481.
26. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 40 L. J. Ch. 242.
27. Hart v. Chesly, 18 N. H. 373; Casper v. Walker, 33 N. 3. Eq. 35;
Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Cal. (N. Y.) 345; Reeves v. Craig, 60 N. C.
208; In Re Kern, 2 Woodw. (Pa.) 272; Keeler v. Keeler, 39 Vt. 550;
Crawford v. Paterson, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 364; Connor v. Sheridan, 116
Wis. 666; Wynne v. Fletcher, 53 Eng. Reprint 423; Irvine v. Irvide, 12
Ky. L. Rep. 827; Lindsey v. Lindsey, 45 Ind. 552.
28. 40 Cyc. 1699.
29. 1 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 130.
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Thus we have shown in our discussion that for the most
part the courts recognize the paramount right of a testator
to dispose of his property as he sees fit. There is only one
instance in which the courts really clash with the wishes of
a testator and that is regarding the general rule in restraint
of marriage. Upon conditions restricting religious freedom
only one prominent case goes against the weight of author-
ity. The better view is to hold a condition in regard to
religion valid. There seems to be no case that goes off the
beaten path in regard to the question of temperate habits
and character.
The decisions in regard to the condition as to education
are far too lax. It is a provision that will improve the
devisee more than any other one, and if the devisee does not
realize this he should forfeit his right to the property. Thi
testator should have a right to prescribe within reasonable
bounds the residence of his devisee. The provision that the
legatee should follow a certain trade within a reasonable
sphere, is for the benefit of the devisee as well as the general
public and should be upheld.
BONITA E. ScaRA m, '25.
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